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COMMENTS
THE DEBATE OVER THE CALIBER OF ARBITRATORS:
JUDGE HAYS AND HIS CRITICS
JULIUS G. GETMANt
In the famous Steelworker Trilogy the Supreme Court established
a strong Federal policy favoring labor arbitration as a means of settling
industrial disputes.' justice Douglas, who wrote the opinions in all three
cases, based his decisions in large part on the premise that labor arbi-
trators are much better qualified than are judges to pass on disputes
arising under collective bargaining agreements. Indeed, Justice Douglas
waxed eloquent when he described the qualifications of arbitrators and
the special expertise which they bring to bear on such cases:
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the
parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the
shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear
considerations which are not expressed in the contract as
criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his judgment
of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract
says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits,
such factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result,
its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether
tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the parties'
objective in using the arbitration process is primarily to further
their common goal of uninterrupted production under the
agreement, to make the agreement serve their specialized needs.
The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experi-
ence and competence to bear upon the determination of a
grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed.!
This paragraph has provoked considerable debate. Although almost
all subsequent writers have agreed that Justice Douglas' description was
uninformed and excessive,' there is considerable difference about how
tProfessor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
3. Fleming described the language quoted above as "a paragraph which caused many
arbitrators to purchase new mirrors." R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS
24 (1965).
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wide of the mark Justice Douglas was.
The strongest attack came from Judge Hays of the Second Circuit
in a highly provocative little book entitled Labor Arbitration, A Dis-
senting View." Not only does Judge Hays argue "that there is no
authority to support the view of arbitration adopted in the Steelworkers
case,"5 he goes much further and offers his own picture of the process,
almost completely at variance with that of the Court.
Judge Hays points out that most arbitration cases in the United
States are decided by arbitrators who have no continuing relation with
the parties but are specially selected for particular cases. Far from having
an intimate knowledge of the common law of the plant and the state of
industrial relations, the arbitrator is likely to be a stranger to the parties
and to the controversy.'
Further, the process by which arbitrators are selected is likely to
involve considerations other than competence. Typically, both parties
choose the arbitrator, and either party has the power to reject any
candidate. Because labor arbitration is a significant part of the industrial
scene in the United States, both labor and management carefully follow
the decisions of arbitrators. Often they know how many cases a potential
arbitrator has decided for labor and how many for management, and
what his views are on significant issues. judge Hays makes the point
that the parties, in fact, choose not on the basis of their confidence in the
judgment of the arbitrator but because their private intelligence indicates
that the arbitrator will decide the issue in a way favorable to them."
While there has been no definitive survey made, many arbitrators and
observers are of the same opinion.'
In order to be chosen, it is necessary that an arbitrator not unduly
offend either labor or management in his decisions, so that he will
continue to be acceptable to both. One of the criticisms made by Judge
Hays and others is that arbitrators are often more concerned with
maintaining their own acceptability than they are with properly deciding
the case. It is claimed that arbitrators try to decide some cases for each
side and to avoid deciding individual cases wholly one way or the other
so that they will not earn the reputation of being unduly favorable to one
side and, thus, become unacceptable to the other. Indeed, both union and
4. P. HAys, LABOR ARBITRATION, A DISSENTING VIEW (1966) (Hereinafter cited
as HAYS).
5. Id. 9.
6. Id. 111-12.
7. Id. 37-75.
8. McDonald, The Selection and Tenure of Arbitrators it; Labor Disputes, N.Y.U.
1ST CorF. ox LABOR 145 (1948); Stein, The Selection of Arbitrators, N.Y.U. 8TH
CoNF. oN LABOR 291 (1955).
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management officials often complain that too many arbitrators tend to
"split a case down the middle," giving a little bit to each side in order
to maintain acceptability.
Judge Hays also says that many arbitrators are not well qualified.
He suggests that many have no special expertise in labor relations or
labor law. In order to substantiate his claim, Judge Hays in his book
analyzes the biographical data on arbitrators which is published by the
Bureau of National Affairs. Many of the people listed could claim no
prior relevant experience in labor law or in any other decision-making
role.'
Judge Hays' disillusionment with arbitration is so great that he
urges that judicial enforcement of arbitral decisions be stopped." He
suggests that if either of the parties refuses to comply with a decision,
courts should be willing to hear the case de novo. If special expertise in
labor matters is thought desirable, he suggests a system of industrial
courts.
Judge Hays' book has been severely criticized by his former col-
leagues." The critics have had two major objections to Judge Hays'
book. They have pointed out that he had no more empirical data or
scholarly research to support his view of arbitration than Justice Douglas
had to support his. 2 And while none have accepted Justice Douglas' idyl-
lic portrait of labor arbitration, they have reported that their own experi-
ence indicates that Judge Hays ignored the positive and exaggerated the
negative aspects of arbitration." The critics suggest that arbitrators are
generally better qualified than Judge Hays suggests. They do not agree
that arbitrators in reaching their decisions are likely to be motivated by
the desire to maintain acceptability. And they generally conclude that the
arbitration process as it now functions does a much better job of meeting
the needs of labor, management, and the public than Judge Hays suggests
and than any alternative method of dispute settlement is likely to do.
The debate between Judge Hays and his critics reveals how little is
actually known. Much of the pertinent literature evaluating the labor
9. HAYS 53-58.
10. As a minimum he suggests much closer judicial scrutiny of arbitral decisions.
HAYS 79-118.
11. See, e.g., Aaron, Book Review, 42 WASHr. L. REv. 976 (1967) ; Meltzer, Book
Review, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 211 (1966); Shieber, Book Review, 41 TUL. L. REv. 743
(1967); Wallen, Book Review, 81 HARv. L. REv. 507(1967); Wallen, Arbitrators and
Judges Dispelling the Hays Haze, 12 Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION INSTITUTE ON LABOR
LAW 159 (1966).
12. Judge Hays did not claim that there was sufficient data from which to draw
conclusions about the way arbitration works. He called for further research, but the
ferocity of his indictment generally belied his disclaimers of adequate information.
13. See note 11 supra.
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arbitration process involves generalization from personal experience,' "
and there are several reasons why this is true. The leading academic
authorities on labor law are almost invariably part-time labor arbitrators,
and their own experiences provide an opportunity to write about some-
thing which they have experienced first hand. Moreover, traditional legal
research directed toward the internal workings of the process is hardly
feasible. Individual decisions are not nearly as important as they are in
other branches of labor law and they rarely merit extensive consideration.
The precedential value of individual decisions is slight, partly because
arbitrators pay less heed to precedent than courts do and partly because
the great number of arbitrators means that on any controversial issue a
variety of differing opinions can be found, making it very difficult to
predict which, if any, will have an impact on the general trend of de-
cisions. Since there is no formal hierarchy, each opinion is as significant
as any other. "
Similarly, the great number of opinions plus the fact that a very
large percentage of significant opinions are never published make it
difficult to discern the general status of the decisions with respect to
significant recurring questions of contract interpretation. Some survey
studies do exist 6 but they rarely involve careful attention to individual
opinions. As a result, we do not have the type of scholarly analysis which
might indicate how well or how badly arbitrators are performing their
assigned task. In view of the large number of arbitrators, their varied
background, and the different forms that arbitration takes, this lack of
information makes any generalization about the caliber of arbitration
hazardous.
It is unlikely that the question of the caliber of labor arbitration
decisions will be resolved. The difficulties discussed above would seem
to preclude a definitive study of this subject. This realization is neither
14. The most significant of these works was Dean Shulman's famous Holmes
lecture delivered at Harvard Law School, entitled "Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor
Relations," appearing in 68 HAv. L. Rav. 999 (1955). Dean Shulman's description
of his experiences as permanent umpire under the Ford Motor Co. Law Contract gave
a picture of the labor arbitration process at its best. By common consent Shulman was
a superb arbitrator. Shulman's talk had, as Judge Hays, points out a "profound in-
fluence on attitude towards labor arbitration in this country." HAYs 3. The talk was
cited repeatedly in the trilogy and Justice Douglas' description of labor arbitration is
more consistent with Shulman's personal experiences than with anything else. See also
Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAgv. L. Rv. 1482 (1959); Davey,
The Supreme Court and Arbitration; The Mushigs of an Arbitrator, 36 Norm DAAE
LAW. 138 (1961) ; Fleming, Reflections on the Natutre of Labor Arbitration, 61 MIcH.
L. Ray. 1245 (1963) ; Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV.
3; Meltzer, Ruminations about Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. L.
Ray. 545 (1967).
15. Cf. Gilbert & Sullivan: "Where everybody is somebody nobody is anybody."
16. See, e.g., Note, Standard for Arbitrators in Suibcontracting Disputes, 39 In.
L.J. 561 (1964).
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surprising nor cause for undue alarm, since there are many classes of
judges whose decisions are similarly insulated from critical scrutiny.
It would be possible, however, to make the current debate a better
informed one. A logical starting point would be an effort to ascertain the
attitude of the parties toward arbitration. An interesting start was made
in an article by Professors Jones and Smith 7 in which they analyzed
the responses to a questionnaire sent to management and union attorneys
and officials. Those contacted were asked whether they were generally
satisfied with the arbitration process, and what suggestions they had for
improvement. The responses indicated general satisfaction and a desire
to retain the current system, but they also indicated several areas of
dissatisfaction. Those responding indicated concern over the scope of the
arbitrator's power and the limited scope for review, the procedural
limits of arbitration hearings, the choices made available to them through
the appointing agencies, delays in the issuance of opinions and the costs
of arbitration. Most of all, they expressed a desire for more competent
arbitrators."8
While the data gathered by Professors Smith and Jones is pro-
vocative, it gives neither a clear nor an authoritative picture of the
attitude of the parties toward arbitration. Their sample was highly
limited and unrepresentative. The responses were primarily from manage-
ment attorneys and included no rank and file union members nor local
officials. Moreover, the questionnaire was not calculated to tap in a
sophisticated fashion the attitudes of the respondents who were merely
expected to sum up their general attitudes toward arbitration.
Further work would be useful. A more comprehensive questionnaire
should be sent to a more carefully selected sample. Those queried should be
asked to compare their attitude toward arbitrators and arbitration with
their attitudes toward the National Labor Relations Board and the courts.
They should also be asked whether they think arbitrators decide cases to
maintain acceptability and what, if any, evidence they have for their
conclusions. Those involved in the selection process should be questioned
concerning the criteria they employ. Personal interviews should be
conducted with people involved in the arbitration process, including
arbitrators. In this way a more valid and comprehensive picture of the
extent to which the process satisfies its constituents would be obtained.
Judge Hays bases his criticism of the arbitration process in part on
his assumption that arbitrators as a group are fairly undistinguished,
17. Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisins of the
Arbitration Process: a Report with Comments, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1115 (1964).
18. Most of these problems which are peripheral to the question of arbitral com-
petence are treated in R. FLEMIING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS (1965).
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with no special competence for their job. This conclusion he supports
with a survey of the arbitrators whose personal backgrounds are listed in
the BNA labor arbitration series. Judge Hays' survey as he acknowledges
is a highly inadequate means of obtaining a picture of who does arbitra-
tion. Not only is the survey composed of an unrepresentative sample,
but it also fails to indicate what proportion of the arbitration is done by
each of the different types represented. Nor does Judge Hays really
direct himself to the question of what constitutes competence for a
labor arbitrator.
Such data as judge Hays presents is not necessarily consistent with
his attack on labor arbitrators. While the group he has selected seems
generally well qualified to serve as decision makers in the field, he gives
the contrary impression by dealing unfairly with his material and slight-
ing the occupational groups represented and emphasizing the exceptions.
Certainly a clearer picture of the people doing labor arbitration and
the distribution of cases is possible."5 The list of arbitrators of the
various referring agencies should be studied and the qualifications of the
arbitrators considered. Discussions with company attorneys and officials
and with union leaders should permit discovery of the identity and
qualifications of arbitrators not on the lists of the referral agencies. By
comparing the qualifications and selection process for arbitrators with
those for N.L.R.B. trial examiners and Federal and State district court
judges, some idea may be obtained as to whether the use of private
citizens as arbitrators results in decision-makers more or less qualified
than government officials.
Only part of judge Hays' criticism is based on the caliber of the
people who arbitrate labor disputes. His main argument is that the system
of selection affects the decisional process by emphasizing acceptability.
This is a difficult question to investigate because it rests on an assumption
about the state of mind of arbitrators which, even if true, one could
hardly expect people to admit freely. Indeed, it is not at all clear that
arbitrators are aware of the extent to which they are motivated by such
considerations. Like all human beings, arbitrators tend to be more con-
scious of their more noble motives; those which cause shame or em-
barrassment are rarely acknowledged and even more rarely assigned their
proper weight. But a fuller picture may be obtained by:
a) Making a careful, fairly extensive survey through questionnaires
and personal interviews of the process by which companies and unions
19. At least one such study has been made. Although the results are old and the
survey incomplete, it does not bear out Judge Hays' charge. Survey of the Arbitration
Profession in 1952 in THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRTIONr 176-82 (BNA 1957).
(selected papers from first seven annual meetings of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, 1948-54).
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select arbitrators, aimed at ascertaining to what extent these parties tend
to pass over an arbitrator because he has decided a recent string of cases
in favor of, or because his over-all average seems weighted in favor of,
the other side. If such considerations are taken into account it should be
ascertained if they are more likely to be applied to newer arbitrators than
to experienced ones.
b) Examining decisions of a selected cross-section of arbitrators to
see if the determinations form a pattern indicating attention to accept-
ability. Such patterns might be contrasted with the decisions of judges
trying section 301 cases or with Trial Examiners in N.L.R.B. cases.
c) Interviewing a carefully selected cross-section of arbitrators to
ascertain how they think the parties go about choosing arbitrators and
how they deal with the problem of maintaining acceptability.
In the final analysis, Judge Hays' argument rests on an assumption
about the way arbitrators themselves perceive the selection process and
how they respond to it. There is little information on either of these
points, and some help could be obtained by merely discussing them with
a cross-section of arbitrators. In particular, it should be possible to
determine whether arbitrators think that they are likely to be harmed
by deciding too many cases for one side or the other. It is unlikely, of
course, that arbitrators would admit to deciding cases in order to
maintain acceptability, but it would be useful to analyze the nature of the
case they make on their own behalf. Review of the literature and discus-
sions with arbitrators indicate that many arbitrators admit to concern
with acceptability but deny that it shapes their opinions. For example,
some claim that such concern actually improves their performance because
it compells them to spell out clearly to the losing side why its arguments
were rejected.2" This writer's comparison of arbitration and judicial
opinion suggests that arbitrators do in fact tend to deal more fully with
the arguments they reject than do courts.
Some arbitrators may claim the ability to wrestle with conscience
and win. They may check their decisions regularly with disinterested
colleagues or they may claim that acceptability is a false independent goal
on the grounds that a decision against the side which has the stronger
case on the merits is likely to be more costly to acceptability than a series
of decisions favoring one side or the other. After all, it is generally
possible to divide enough cases both ways on the merits to avoid the fatal
reputation for being completely partisan.
In discussion with union and management officials I have noticed
that both sides are often bitter about the claimed tendency of arbitrators
20. See Meltzer, Ruminations about Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34
U. Cm. L. REv. 545 (1967).
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to attempt, Solomon like, to split cases down the middle, awarding
something to each side. This claimed tendency is the most frequently
cited "proof" that arbitrators decide in terms of their own self interest
rather than "on the merits." In evaluating this argument it would be
useful to compare the incidence of split decisions by arbitrators and by
judges in section 301 cases. However, even if arbitrators split their
decisions more frequently than judges it does not necessarily follow that
their reason is to preserve acceptability. This writer suspects that many
split decisions result from the arbitrator's lack of assurance about his
factual determinations.
Arbitration is a particularly poor process for determining the facts.
A comparison of arbitration with proceedings before the National Labor
Relations Board is useful in explaining why.
When an unfair labor practice charge is filed with the N.L.R.B., a
preliminary investigation is conducted by trained government personnel.
During the investigation, all parties have the opportunity to discuss the
critical facts. Meetings are held to attempt to compromise and, as a result,
the issues are usually quite well drawn. If a hearing is necessary, one is
held before an expert hearing officer. Both the government and the
respondent are represented by attorneys and, in many cases, so is the
party who files the charge. The parties know what it is they wish to
bring out and the hearing may go on for several days if the matter is an
important one. The hearing officer has powers of subpoena and a
trained court reporter makes a record of the hearing so that a complete
transcript is available to the examiner when he makes his decision.
In arbitration, by contrast, the parties are generally not represented
by attorneys: The union is usually represented by a business agent, who
is apt to be very busy and often has just learned the facts of the case.
Companies are usually represented by personnel directors. Thus, each
party's case is likely to be handled by someone who is not an expert at
bringing out facts through examination and cross-examination of wit-
nesses. It oreover, quite frequently the issue in dispute has not been
isolated, so that at the hearing neither side is clear about what it wants to
prove, and it is rarely possible to extend the hearing beyond a single
day in order to ensure that all the pertinent testimony has been elicited.
Very often the arbitrator, who does not have subpoena power, serves as
his own court reporter. While ruling on questions of evidence and
attempting to judge the credibility of the witness he must take notes on
his testimony. In my own limited experience I have found the task of
taking notes while performing other functions a tremendously demanding
one, and in such cases I have never felt complete confidence in my
judgment as to the facts of the dispute. Where an arbitrator is uncertain
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of the facts he might well try to give a little bit to each side in order to
avoid being fooled completely. Accordingly, if split decisions occur more
frequently in arbitrations, it would be desirable to find out if such
decisions occur most often in cases in which there are significant factual
disputes which are not presented by attorneys or in cases in which the
arbitrator acts as his own reporter.
Careful investigation might also reveal the extent to which arbitra-
tion serves significant interests which would not necessarily be served by
any officially sanctioned substitute. For example, in this writer's view it
is a matter of considerable significance that to rank-and-file employees
arbitration is a familiar process, one in which they are not afraid to
speak freely. Employees are frightened by formal proceedings before
governmental agencies. I have observed that rank-and-file union members
invariably display considerable timidity in N.L.R.B. hearings, and I
have heard burly steelworkers and coal-miners express anxiety, in some
cases approaching terror, at the thought of appearing in court. Arbitra-
tion, however, is much different. The hearing generally takes place in
the company premises or in a hotel room where there is often little
formality. The fact that the arbitrator is a private citizen rather than a
government official makes him less frightening. Some of the very factors
which make arbitration an imperfect way of finding facts make it
comfortable for the employees. Accordingly, they are willing to appear
in arbitration hearings and to speak with considerable freedom. Thus, in
my view arbitration gives employees a sense of having had their "day
in court," without its normal disadvantages.
The validity of this theory could be checked fairly easily by extensive
discussion with employees. It should be possible to determine how
employees and union leaders perceive the arbitration process in this
regard and how their perception of the process differs from their percep-
tion of N.L.R.B. or court proceedings. Interviews might well bring out
other strengths or weaknesses in the process. One of the chief problems
with the current debate over arbitration is that little or no systematic
effort has been made to obtain the views of those most directly affected,
the employees.
